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CINCEUR FOR POLAD

EO 11652: GDS

TAGS: AMGT, PFOR, IR

SUBJ: ANNUAL POLICY AND RESOURCE ASSESSMENT FOR IRAN-

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PART ONE

REF: (A) STATE 38356 (DTG 190052Z FEB 77)

(B) STATE 38338 (DTG 190017Z FEB 77)

(C) STATE 49794 (DTG 071620Z MAR 77)

PART 1 - POLICY ASSESSMENTS

A. US INTERESTS IN IRAN

1. THE UNITED STATES AND IRAN WERE DRAWN TOGETHER AT THE END OF WORLD WAR II THROUGH A MUTUAL INTEREST IN CONTAINING SOVIET EXPANSIONIST POLICIES. (NORTHWESTERN IRAN WAS OCCUPIED BY THE SOVIET UNION AT THAT TIME.) US-IRAN RELATIONS HAVE BEEN ANIMATED BY THIS SHARED INTEREST EVER SINCE, AND A NUMBER OF COOPERATIVE ARRANGEMENTS WERE MADE TO PROMOTE THE ACHIEVEMENT AND MAINTENANCE OF THIS COMMON GOAL. AT A TIME WHEN WE WERE IN A POSITION TO DO SO WE PLACED A SECURITY SHIELD AROUND IRAN THROUGH A BILATERAL COMMITMENT TO COME TO IRAN'S DEFENSE IF IT WERE ATTACKED BY THE USSR OR ITS COMMUNIST ALLIES. WE ALSO ASSOCIATED OURSELVES WITH THE BAGHDAD PACT (LATER CENTO) IN PART FOR THE SAME PURPOSE. CONCURRENTLY, WE UNDERTOOK AN EXTENSIVE PROGRAM OF ECONOMIC, TECHNICAL AND MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO ENABLE IRAN TO DEFEND ITS OWN INTERESTS AND DEVELOP ITS RESOURCES IN AN ENVIRONMENT OF INTERNAL STABILITY AND ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REFORM. MANY OF THESE PROGRAMS ACHIEVED THEIR PURPOSE AND WERE TERMINATE. THE ONLY ARRANGEMENT OF MAJOR SIGNIFICANCE STILL CONTINUING IS IN THE MILITARY ASSISTANCE FIELD, WITH THE US PROVIDING ARMS AND TECHNICAL SUPPORT NOW PAID FOR FULLY BY IRAN. ON ITS

PART, STRATEGICALLY-PLACE IRAN PROVIDES US THE SITES FOR VALUABLE AND NOT EASILY REPLACEABLE INTELLIGENCE AND COMMUNICATIONS FACILITIES, AS WELL AS ASSURED OVERFLIGHT RIGHTS THROUGH OUR ONLY SAFE AND AVAILABLE EAST-WEST AIR SECRET

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CORRIDOR IN THIS PART OF THE WORLD.

2. IN THE MEANTIME THE QUALITY AND NATURE OF THE RELATIONSHIP HAS EVOLVED, ALTHOUGH ITS UNDERLYING PURPOSE REMAINS ESSENTIALLY THE SAME. AS IRAN DEVELOPED, BEGAN TO PROSPER, AND TO GAIN CONFIDENCE IN ITS OWN CAPABILITIES, THE US EXPECTED AND ASKED IRAN TO PLAY A MORE ACTIVE ROLE IN THE REGIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL ARENAS. IN LARGE MEASURE IRAN HAS BEEN RESPONSIVE WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF WHAT THE SHAH, IRAN'S PRINCIPAL POLICYMAKER, SEES AS A "SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP" COMPARABLE IN SOME RESPECTS AND FOR MUCH THE SAME REASONS TO THE US RELATIONSHIP WITH NATO AND ISRAEL. AT OUR REQUEST IRAN PARTICIPATED IN THE FOUR-POWER COMMISSION IN VIETNAM AND PROVIDED OUR SOUTH VIETNAMESE ALLY WITH MILITARY EQUIPMENT. MORE RECENTLY IT SENT A MILITARY CONTINGENT FOR TRUCE SUPERVISION DUTIES ON THE GOLAN HEIGHTS. AT OUR BEHEST IT HAS PROVIDED FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE TO EGYPT AND A NUMBER OF OTHER NEEDY COUNTRIES IN WHICH WE HAVE A SHARED INTEREST. IRAN HAS BEEN A MAJOR

CONTRIBUTOR TO IFAD AND WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR PROVIDING THE FINAL INCREMENT WHICH MET US CONDITIONS FOR PARTICIPATING. IRAN HAS ALSO PLAYED A MODERATING SUPPORTIVE ROLE IN REGIONAL AFFAIRS, CONCILIATING LOCAL DISPUTES AND HELPING OMAN PUT DOWN A COMMUNIST-SUPPORTED INSURGENCY IN OMAN'S SOUTHERN REGION. IN SUM, COMMENSURATE WITH ITS ABILITY AND INFLUENCE, IT HAS PLAYED A CONSTRUCTIVE AND HELPFUL ROLE IN MATTERS OF DIRECT US CONCERN. OVER THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE PRINCIPAL US INTERESTS IN IRAN ARE AS FOLLOWS:

(A) MAINTAINING A STABLE, INDEPENDENT NON-COMMUNIST AND COOPERATIVE IRAN WHICH HAS THE STRENGTH AND WILL TO RESIST POTENTIAL SOVIET AGGRESSIVENESS, WHETHER DIRECT OR INDIRECT, AND TO CONTINUE ITS ROLE FOR STABILITY IN THE PERSIAN GULF, MIDDLE EAST, AND SOUTH ASIA;

(B) SAFEGUARDING A RELIABLE SOURCE OF PETROLEUM
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TO THE WEST, JAPAN, AND ISRAEL AT AS LOW A PRICE AS POSSIBLE (A PRIORITY CONSIDERATION FOR NEA AREA-WIDE POLICY), BEARING IN MIND THE LIMITED LEVERAGE WE POSSESS ON IRANIAN PRICE POSITIONS;

(C) FOSTERING GREATER IRANIAN SUPPORT FOR THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION'S EMPHASIS ON IMPROVED HUMAN RIGHTS, NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION, AND RESTRAINT WITH RESPECT TO CONVENTIONAL ARMS TRANSFERS;

(D) MAINTAINING US ACCESS TO THE IRANIAN PORTION OF THE VITAL TURKISH-IRANIAN AIR CORRIDOR (AND ACCESS TO IRANIAN PORTS FOR US VESSELS) IN SUPPORT OF OUR SHARED SECURITY INTERESTS;

(E) MAINTAINING USE OF IRANIAN TERRITORY FOR SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE AND COMMUNICATIONS FACILITIES WHICH COULD NOT BE RELOCATED ELSEWHERE WITHOUT A SIGNIFICANT

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LOSS OF EFFECTIVENESS;

(F) MAINTAINING ACCESS ON FAVORABLE TERMS FOR
AMERICAN GOODS AND SERVICES TO THE RAPIDLY GROWING
IRANIAN MARKET, AS WELL AS CONTINUING US- IRANIAN FINANCIAL
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COOPERATION;

(G) MAINTAINING AN EFFECTIVE AND COOPERATIVE
DIALOGUE WITH IRAN ON A HOST OF MULTILATERAL ECONOMIC AND
POLITICAL QUESTIONS SUCH AS NORTH-SOUTH ECONOMIC COOPERA-
TION, ARAB-ISRAEL RELATIONS, ARMS CONTROL, INDIAN OCEAN
AND PERSIAN GULF ISSUES, AND LAW OF THE SEA;

(H) ENCOURAGING GREATER IRANIAN COOPERATION IN
OUR WORLDWIDE ANTI-NARCOTICS EFFORTS.

B. OVERVIEW

1. TWO OF IRAN'S BASIC POLICIES MOST DIRECTLY SHAPED BY ITS PROXIMITY TO THE SOVIET UNION AND ITS ASSESSMENT OF SOVIET INTENTIONS ARE ITS MILITARY MODERNIZATION PROGRAM AND REPRESSION OF INTERNAL COMMUNIST ACTIVITY. THESE ARE ALSO TWO POLICIES MOST LIKELY TO BE BROUGHT INTO QUESTION BY THE NEW ADMINISTRATION'S EMPHASIS ON LIMITING TRANSFER OF CONVENTIONAL ARMS AND ON HUMAN RIGHTS. LACK OF AGREEMENT IN EITHER AREA IS CERTAIN TO INFLUENCE ADVERSELY THE MEASURE OF SUCCESS WE HAVE IN FURTHERING OUR OTHER INTERESTS IN IRAN AND, TO SOME DEGREE, IN THE REGION.

2. OUR AGING SECURITY COMMITMENT TO IRAN IS NO LONGER CREDIBLE. WITH US ENCOURAGEMENT IRAN HAS SEEN ITS ONLY VIABLE ALTERNATIVE AS MILITARY SELF-SUFFICIENCY--ALTHOUGH IT HAS NO ILLUSIONS THAT IT WOULD EVER BE IN A POSITION SINGLEHANDEDLY TO DETER DIRECT SOVIET AGGRESSION. THUS IT HAS EMBARKED ON A LARGE-SCALE AND EXPENSIVE MILITARY MODERNIZATION PROGRAM AND THE ACQUISITION OF HIGHLY SOPHISTICATED WEAPONS SYSTEMS, PRINCIPALLY FROM THE UNITED STATES. IT MEASURES ITS NEED AGAINST ITS ASSESSMENT OF POTENTIAL THREAT FROM ITS NEIGHBORS, PARTICULARLY THE USSR AND IRAQ, AND THE KIND OF MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT IT REQUIRES TO DEFEND ITS BORDERS AND THEIR APPROACHES

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FROM ANY DIRECTION.

3. THE QUESTION OF WHAT MAY MODERATE IRAN'S MILITARY BUILD-UP IS KEY. THE SHAH HAS ALREADY INDICATED THAT IF THE US CUTS OFF ARMS SUPPLIES HE WILL TURN ELSEWHERE. RECENT SIGNIFICANT PURCHASES FROM OTHER COUNTRIES, INCLUDING THE SOVIET UNION, LEND SUBSTANCE TO HIS DETERMINATION. FULL SUCCESS IN CURTAILING IRAN'S ARMS ACQUISITION PROGRAM, THEREFORE, CAN ONLY BE ACHIEVED BY A GENERAL MORATORIUM OF ARMS TRANSFERS TO THE AREA BY ALL ARMS SUPPLIERS. IN OUR JUDGMENT UNILATERAL EFFORTS WILL NOT ACHIEVE SUCH A PURPOSE.

4. BETWEEN THE EXTREMES OF A TOTAL CUT-OFF AND UNLIMITED SUPPLY, HOWEVER, WE BELIEVE THERE IS ROOM FOR MANEUVER. THE OUTCOME WILL BE INFLUENCED BY HOW EFFECTIVELY AND PERSUASIVELY WE CAN MOVE TOWARD REACHING MUTUAL AGREEMENT WITH IRAN ON THE NATURE OF THE CURRENT AND FUTURE THREATS AND ON WHAT IS REQUIRED TO MEET THEM. IN MANY RESPECTS THIS CONSULTATION PROCESS SHOULD BE AKIN TO THE US-ISRAELI MODEL. IT WOULD INVOLVE NOT ONLY DETAILED EXAMINATION OF THE REGIONAL POLITICAL-MILITARY ENVIRONMENT BUT ALSO A METHODOICAL EXAMINATION OF IRAN'S FINANCIAL AND HUMAN RESOURCES, ITS INFRASTRUCTURE AND ITS

ABSORPTIVE CAPACITY. SUCH A COURSE OF ACTION WOULD REQUIRE DEDICATION OF TECHNICALLY QUALIFIED PERSONNEL NOT PRESENTLY COMMITTED AT EITHER THE WASHINGTON OR TEHRAN ENDS. IT WOULD ALSO ASSUME A CAPABILITY AND WILLINGNESS ON THE IRANIAN SIDE NOT YET TESTED FULLY. HOWEVER, IN THE ABSENCE OF SUCH AN EFFORT, UNILATERAL USG DECISIONS TO CUT BACK SUPPLY TO IRAN WOULD BE INTERPRETED AS A LOWERING OF US INTEREST IN AND FRIENDSHIP FOR IRAN, WITH THE ATTENDANT CONSEQUENCES.

5. THE OTHER POTENTIALLY SERIOUS AREA OF DIFFERENCE CONCERNS HUMAN RIGHTS. IN OUR JUDGMENT THERE IS AS WIDE
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A GAP BETWEEN SOME WESTERN IMAGES OF CURRENT-DAY IRAN AND IRANIAN REALITY AS THERE IS BETWEEN THE WESTERN AND THE IRANIAN CULTURAL, ETHICAL, AND HISTORICAL EXPERIENCES. IRAN HAS HAD A HISTORY OF OVER 2,500 YEARS OF MAINLY AUTOCRATIC, OFTEN FOREIGN, RULERS AND ONLY RELATIVELY BRIEF EXPOSURE TO WESTERN LIBERAL VALUES. THE CONCEPT OF DEMOCRATIC PROCESS ARE ESSENTIALLY ALIEN TO

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ITS TRADITION ALTHOUGH IT HAS BEEN IN THE VANGUARD OF CERTAIN HUMAN RIGHTS, SUCH AS RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, CHERISHED IN THE WEST. LAND REFORM, MASS EDUCATION, WOMEN'S RIGHTS, AND OTHER SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC REFORMS HAVE ONLY RECENTLY (IN THE 1960'S AND 1970'S) BEEN INTRODUCED AGAINST EXTEN-
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SIVE CONSERVATIVE OPPOSITION. THERE SEEMS LITTLE DOUBT THAT EVEN THESE LIMITED ADVANCES WOULD NOT HAVE BEEN ACHIEVED IN THE ABSENCE OF THE STONG AND DETERMINED LEADERSHIP OF THE SHAH AND HIS FATHER BEFORE HIM. WITHIN THESE SAME FEW DECADES THE SHAH HAS BEEN CHALLENGED BY BOTH THE COMMUNIST-SUPPORTED LEFT AND THE LAND-OWNING, CONSERVATIVE MOSLEM RIGHT, AND ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS BROUGHT TO THE VERGE OF COLLAPSE WHICH WOULD HAVE PROBABLY ENTAILED A REVERSAL OF IRAN'S PRO-WESTERN ORIENTATION.

6. MOST RECENTLY, IRAN HAS HAD TO CONTEND WITH SMALL BUT DEDICATED AND LOOSELY-KNIT CONGERIES OF MARXIST-MOSLEM OPPOSITIONISTS WHO HAVE RESORTED TO TERRORISM AND VIOLENCE IN ATTEMPTS TO OVERTHROW THE PRESENT ORDER. THERE IS EVIDENCE OF OUTSIDE SUPPORT FOR THESE EFFORTS. THE REGIME HAS RESPONDED VIGOROUSLY, ALTHOUGH NOT ALWAYS EFFICIENTLY. ITS SUCCESSES HAVE BEEN MAINLY AT THE POPULAR POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC LEVEL BY PRE-EMPTING THE PROGRAMS AND POLICIES ANY CONVEIVALBE OPPOSITION MIGHT ADVOCATE AND CO-OPTING MANY POTENTIAL OPPOSITIONISTS INTO LEGITIMATE ACTIVITY. WHAT REMAINS IS AN OPPOSITION WITH FEW POLICY AIMS BEYOND A GENERALIZED DESIRE TO SUPPLANT THE PRESENT LEADERSHIP IN POWER-- A POSTURE THAT DOES EVOKE ANY WIDE POPULAR SUPPORT IN IRAN. THE REGIME'S ATTITUDE TOWARD THIS OPPOSITION, WHICH IT CONSIDERS TO MAINLY COMMUNIST-ORIENTED AND/OR INSPIRED, IS HARSH AND REGULATED BY LAWS AKIN TO THOSE THAT WERE BEING ADVOCATED IN THE UNITED STATES IN THE 1950'S.

FURTHER, ITS CIVIL COURT SYSTEM IS CLOGGED AND SUBJECT TO MUCH CRITICISM FOR ITS INEFFICIENCIES. THIS SITUATION, MARRED TO A MISH-MASH OF NAPOLEONIC AND ISLAMIC CODES, RESULTS IN THE DESIGN OF A JUDICIAL PROCEDURE TO DEAL WITH SECURITY ISSUES ALIEN TO WESTERN (AT LEAST ANGLO-SAXON) CONCEPTS OF DUE PROCESS. THERE ARE PROBABLY ABOUT 3,500 "POLITICAL PRISONERS" IN IRAN ALTHOUGH AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL AND SIMILAR GROUPS HAVE CLAIMED THAT THERE

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ARE UP TO 200,000. AMONG THESE THE LARGE MAJORITY HAVE ENGAGED IN OR CONSPIRED IN ACTS OF VIOLENCE. WHAT WE CONFRONT, THEREFORE, IN ADVOCATING THE ADOPTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS POLICIES MORE ATTUNED WITH OUR OWN CONCEPTS, IS A FUNDAMENTAL DIFFERENCE IN LEGAL AND ATTITUDINAL POSTURES NOT UNIQUE TO THE PRESENT REGIME AND DEEPLY IMBEDDED IN THE IRANIAN TRADITION. THE PRESENT GOVERNMENT IS NOT INDIFFERENT TO OUR CONCERNS OR UNALTERABLY OPPOSED TO CHANGE. WE HAVE SEEN A MODICUM OF IMPROVEMENT IN THIS AREA, AND WE BELIEVE WE CAN EXPECT MORE IF WE PROCEED QUIETLY WITH PERSISTENCE AND PATIENCE IN A NON-CONFRONTATIONAL MANNER.

7. ANOTHER AREA OF DIFFERENCE CONCERNS OIL PRICES. IRAN HAS CONSISTENTLY ARGUED THAT (A) OIL PRICE RISES HAVE NOT CONTRIBUTED AS MUCH TO THE WEST'S (OR EVEN LDC) ECONOMIC WOES AS WESTERN COMMENTATORS SAY; (B) OIL IS A RESOURCE TO BE CONSERVED AND HIGHER PRICES ENCOURAGE DEVELOPMENT OF ALTERNATIVE ENERGY SOURCES; WHILE (C) IRAN IS JUSTIFIED IN RAISING THE PRICE OF ITS MAIN EXPORT IN VIEW OF RISING PRICES FOR WESTERN GOODS, BOTH MILITARY AND NON-MILITARY. THIS IS A POSITION WHICH WESTERN ARGUMENTS HAVE NOT SUCCEEDING IN ERODING. DEVELOPMENTS OVER THE NEXT FEW YEARS (SUCH AS THE PRESENT TWO-TIEW QUARREL IN OPEC) COULD CONCEIVABLY LEAD TO SOME CHIPPING AWAY OF IRANIAN RESOLVE. HOWEVER, THE SHAH HAS TAKEN THE POSITION THAT OIL POLICY IS AN ECONOMIC MATTER, NOT TO BE AFFECTED BY POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS. (HE THEREFORE REFUSED TO JOIN IN THE 1973 ARAB EMBARGO AND CONTINUES TO BE THE MAJOR SUPPLIER OF OIL TO ISRAEL.) WE CAN, AND SHOULD, CONTINUE TO PRESENT OUR VIEWPOINT ON OIL PRICES (AND SUPPLIES) ON A REGULAR BASIS, SEEKING A CONTINUING CONSULTATIVE DIALOGUE WITH THE IRANIANS SO THAT OVER TIME WE MIGHT ERODE THOSE OF THEIR ARGUMENTS FOR WHICH WE HAVE EFFECTIVE COUNTER-ARGUMENTS. WE SHOULD CONTINUE TO STUDY THE WHOLE QUESTION OF PRICE INDEXATION, SINCE IT IS NOT

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AT ALL EXCLUDED THAT THIS MIGHT IN TIME MINIMIZE UNILATERAL OPEC PRICE RISES, OR THOSE THAT WOULD OTHERWISE OCCUR ON THE OPEN MARKET. BUT ON THIS ISSUE AS ON OTHERS WE HAVE LITTLE TO GAIN AND MUCH TO LOSE BY DIRECT CONFRONTATION. IT WILL BE MORE EFFECTIVE TO ARGUE IN FRIENDLY
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TERMS.

8. OUR EVIDENCE INDICATES THE SHAH IS SINCERELY CONVINCED OF THE CASE FOR NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION IN IRAN'S CASE. AT THE SAME TIME, HE IS COMMITTED TO A HEAVY INVESTMENT IN PEACEFUL NUCLEAR ENERGY DEVELOPMENT AND CONCERNED TO ASSURE ADEQUATE NUCLEAR FUEL IN THE FUTURE. IRAN HAS ALREADY BEEN CASTING ABOUT IN SOUTH AFRICA, ZAIRE, AND ELSEWHERE FOR DIVERSIFIED SOURCES OF SUCH FUEL. IT CAN BE EXPECTED TO CONTINUE TO BE INTERESTED IN US ENRICHMENT PLANTS AND SIMILAR TECHNOLOGY, GAUGING THE DEGREE OF ITS FUTURE COOPERATION WITH THE USG ON WORLDWIDE NUCLEAR GOALS BY THE DEGREE OF US COOPERATION IT GETS ON ITS OWN CONCERN FOR ASSURED SUPPLIES OF FUEL.

9. THE US REMAINS (MARGINALLY) THE LARGEST EXPORTER TO IRAN OF NON-MILITARY (AS WELL AS MILITARY) GOODS AND SERVICES. THE DIP IN 1976 TO APPROXIMATELY \$2.8 BILLION OF NON-MILITARY US EXPORTS TO IRAN IS EXPECTED TO RISE THROUGH THE COMING YEAR TO APPROXIMATE ITS 1975 PLATEAU OF ABOUT \$3.2 BILLION. WE WOULD EXPECT IT TO REMAIN AROUND \$3 BILLION OVER THE NEXT FEW YEARS.

10. IN MULTILATERAL ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL QUESTIONS IRAN WILL PROBABLY CONTINUE TO BE TORN BETWEEN (A) CAUTION TO AVOID COLLISION WITH LDC INTERESTS ON THE ONE HAND AND (B) SENSITIVITY TO MAINTAINING GOOD RELATIONS WITH THE MAJOR DEVELOPED COUNTRIES. IN NORTH-SOUTH FORUMS IRAN IS LIKELY TO SUPPORT THE LDC POINT OF VIEW, BUT ITS ENTHUSIASM WILL VARY FROM ISSUE TO ISSUE. IFAD IS ANOTHER INSTRUMENT WHICH WILL BE IMPORTANT TO IRANIAN POLICY (PARTICULARLY IF IFAD HEADQUARTERS END UP IN TEHRAN) WHILE ITS ROLE IN OLDER INTERNATIONAL BODIES OR GROUPINGS SUCH AS UNCTAD, GATT, AND EVEN THE G-77 WILL CONTINUE MORE PASSIVE.

11. IRANIAN STUDENTS IN THE US REMAIN PROBABLY THE LARGEST CONTINGENT FROM ANY FOREIGN COUNTRY AND CAN BE
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EXPECTED TO RISE IN NUMBER BEYOND THE ESTIMATED 30,000 NOW THERE. THIS WILL NOT CHANGE THE IRANIAN GOVERNMENT'S JAUNDICED VIEW OF RADICAL IRANIAN OPPOSITION ACTIVITIES IN THE US AND WESTERN EUROPE, BUT THE ISSUE SHOULD REMAIN REASONABLE CONTAINED AS LONG AS BOTH IRAN AND WE KEEP IT IN THE LARGER PERSPECTIVE OF OUR OVERALL RELATIONSHIP.

12. THERE ARE SOME ADDITIONAL POLICY AIMS OF THE USG IN IRAN SUCH AS WINNING IRANIAN COOPERATION FOR AN

EFFECTIVE PROGRAM AGAINST OPIUM PRODUCTION IN NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES, GETTING IRANIAN VOTES IN UN BODIES FOR A VARIETY OF USG POSITIONS, ETC. HOWEVER, THESE, ALONG WITH THE MORE MAJOR INTERESTS ALREADY MENTIONED, ARE MUTUALLY INTERDEPENDENT AND DERIVE FROM AN OVERALL CLIMATE OF FRIENDSHIP AND COOPERATION AS IT CONTINUES TO BE PERCEIVED BY THE SHAH.

C. OBJECTIVES, COURSES OF ACTION, AND ISSUES

1. OUR OBJECTIVES ARE THOSE OUTLINED IN PART A AS US INTERESTS. PRINCIPAL COURSES OF ACTION IN SUPPORT OF THESE INTERESTS OR OBJECTIVES ARE AS FOLLOWS:

A. CONTINUE THE SALE OF CONVENTIONAL ARMS TO IRAN, ATTEMPTING THROUGH CLOSER TECHNICAL CONSULTATION BETWEEN THE US AND IRANIAN DEFENSE ESTABLISHMENTS TO CONVINCE IRANIAN POLICYMAKERS OF THEIR OWN INTEREST IN BEING MORE SELECTIVE AND DRAWING OUT THE PACE OF ARMS MODERNIZATION FOR MORE EFFECTIVE ABSORPTION. EMPHASIZE OUR MUTUAL INTEREST IN A STRONG, SECURE IRAN THROUGH CLOSE CONSULTATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO GOVERNMENTS, INCLUDING ADEQUATE EXPOSURE OF THE SHAH TO THE PRESIDENT AND THE SECRETARY OF STATE, AS WELL AS FREQUENT CONTACTS AT SEVERAL LEVELS INVOLVING HIGH OFFICIALS IN WASHINGTON AS WELL AS THE AMBASSADOR AND HIS STAFF IN TEHRAN. NOTE AT THE SAME TIME THE USG'S BASIC COMMITMENT TO A LOWER LEVEL OF

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ARMAMENTS THROUGHOUT THE WORLD TO WHICH WE HOPE AND EXPECT IRAN WILL MAKE ITS CONTRIBUTION. THE CHANCES OF OUR ACHIEVING SUCH A REDUCTION OF ARMAMENTS WILL BE ENHANCED TO THE EXTENT THAT WE CAN:

1. CONVINCE IRAN OF OUR CONTINUING RELIABILITY AS A SUPPLIER OF NEEDED ARMS

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AND TECHNICAL SERVICES,

2. DEVELOP BROAD INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT (INCLUDING THAT OF THE
USSR) FOR LOWERING THE LEVEL OF ARMS TRANSFERS, AND

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3. HELP IMPROVE THE SECURITY SITUATION IN THE REGION AROUND IRAN,
THROUGH SUCH POSSIBLE DEVELOPMENTS AS A LOWER RATE OF IRAQI ARMAMENT
(
ASSOCIATED PERHAPS WITH AN ARAB-ISRAEL SETTLEMENT) OR A MORE
MEANINGFUL INDIAN-PAKISTANI RAPPROCHEMENT. (NOTE IN THIS CONNEC-
TION THAT WITHDRAWAL OF US AND SOVIET FORCES FROM THE
INDIAN OCEAN WOULD NOT IN ITSELF LOWER IRANIAN CONCERN
ABOUT THE FUTURE INTENTIONS OF NEIGHBORS SUCH AS INDIA OR IRAQ.)

THE ARMISH/MAAG MISSION, EVEN IF PARED DOWN IN NUMBERS, SHOULD
CONTINUE TO PROVIDE LEADERSHIP TO THE LARGE NUMBERS OF USG AND
PRIVATE TECHNICAL PERSONNEL ASSISTING IRAN'S MILITARY MODERNIZATION
THROUGH PROGRAMS PAID FOR ENTIRELY BY THE IRANIANS. AN INCREASE IN

THE PERSONNEL OF THE EMBASSY'S POL/MIL SECTION SHOULD HELP GIVE DIRECTION TO THIS EFFORT.

B. EVINCE CONTINUING US CONCERN FOR HUMAN RIGHTS IN IRAN BOTH IN TERMS OF IRAN'S IMAGE AS A DE FACTO ALLY OF THE US AND FOR IRAN'S OWN FUTURE STABILITY IN WHICH THE US IS INTERESTED. AVOID EX CATHEDRA DENUNCIATIONS, OR EXCESSIVE USG SUPPORT FOR CRITICS OF IRAN'S HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATION, BUT WORK PERSISTENTLY WITH IRANIAN POLICYMAKERS AND THE BUREAUCRACY TO IDENTIFY AREAS IN WHICH LIBERALIZATION OF IRANIAN LAW OR PRACTICE WILL NOT HURT IRANIAN INTERNAL SECURITY, BUT INDEED HELP IT IN THE LONG RUN.

C. PUSH FOR REGULAR CONSULTATIONS AND INDEED A DIALOGUE WITH IRAN ON THE PRICE OF OIL, PARTICULARLY AS IT RELATES TO THE PRICES OF IMPORTS FROM THE US (AN ARGUMENT THE SHAH IS FOND OF USING WITH US). TRY TO DEMONSTRATE, INsofar AS THAT IS POSSIBLE, THAT IRANIANS OVERSTATE THE DEGREE OF INFLATION IN ITEMS THEY BUY FROM US (BALANCING RISES IN COSTS FOR MILITARY EQUIPMENT AND SERVICES AGAINST THE MORE MODEST PRICES OF NON-MILITARY IMPORTS). WE SHOULD RECOGNIZE, HOWEVER, THAT THERE ARE LIMITS TO HOW HARD WE SHOULD PUSH AS LONG AS

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1. IRAN CONTINUES TO SHOW NOT POLITICAL DISCRIMINATION IN WHOM IT SUPPLIES (E.G., NO EMBARGO ON ISRAEL OR THE WEST), AND

2. IRANIAN PRICE IS NOT SIGNIFICANTLY OUT OF LINE WITH THAT ELSEWHERE IN THE WORLD.

D. CONTINUE OUR DIALOGUE WITH IRAN TO MAINTAIN GOI COMMITMENT TO AND ASSISTANCE ON NON-PROLIFERATION MATTERS. IT SHOULD BE IN OUR INTEREST TO HELP ASSURE IRAN OF A RELIABLE SUPPLY OF FUEL FOR ITS GROWING PEACEFUL NUCLEAR ENERGY PROGRAM. IN RETURN WE SHOULD BE ABLE TO CALL ON IRAN FOR ASSISTANCE IN DISSUADING OTHERS FROM PURSUING NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION, AS IRAN HAS BEEN USEFUL IN THE PAST (E.G., WITH PAKISTAN).

E. CONTINUE OUR INTELLIGENCE COOPERATION WITH IRAN SO AS TO PROVIDE A CONTINUALLY IMPROVED JOINT PRODUCT AND DEMONSTRATE OUR CONTINUING INTEREST IN IRAN'S SECURITY AT A TIME WHEN WE SHALL BE URGING SMALLER, MORE SELECTIVE PURCHASES OF ARMS.

F. CONTINUE OUR STRONG SUPPORT OF PRIVATE, NON-MILITARY US COMMERCIAL EXPORTS TO IRAN THROUGH OUR EMBASSY COMMERCAIL OFFICERS, THE US TRADE CENTER, AND SPECIAL TRADE FAIRS OR EXHIBITS IN SUPPORT OF OUR WORLD-

WIDE COMMERCIAL PROGRAMS. CONTINUE A STEADY LEVEL OF ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL REPORTING TO KEEP UP WITH CHANGING TRENDS IN IRANIAN ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR OR PERCEPTIONS (E.G., US COMPANIES INTERESTED IN POSSIBLE BARTER AGREEMENTS UTILIZING OIL). MAINTAIN OUR INTEREST IN IRANIAN AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION THROUGH DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE REPRESENTATIVES HERE, NOTING THAT CONTINUING IMPROVEMENT IN IRANIAN AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION ASSISTS THE PROCESS OF SOCIAL AS WELL AS ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, AND THUS POLITICAL STABILITY.

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G. CONTINUE AN EFFECTIVE USIS CULTURAL AND INFORMATION PROGRAM AS ANOTHER MEANS OF ASSISTING IRAN'S DEVELOPMENT, DEMONSTRATING UNDIMINISHED US INTEREST IN IRAN'S FUTURE, AND CONTINUING TO BUILD TIES WITH IRAN'S OPINION LEADERS IN EDUCATION, INFORMATION, AND RELATED FIELDS WHICH IN THE LONG RUN SHOULD MARKEDLY ASSIST IRAN'S TRANSITION TO A MORE DEMOCRATIC ENVIRONMENT.

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ACTION NEA-10

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AMEMBASSY ANKARA
UNSINT BAGHDAD
AMEMBASSY CAIRO
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS
AMEMBASSY DOHA
AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD

AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY KABUL
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY MUSCAT
AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
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H. ALSO SUPPORT GREATER PEOPLE-TO-PEOPLE CONTACTS THROUGH THE STREAM OF IRANIAN VISITORS TO THE US AND THE LARGE NUMBER OF IRANIAN STUDENTS STUDYING THERE. ADEQUATE MANNING OF THE EMBASSY'S VISA SERVICES IS REQUIRED.

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I. BY THE SAME TOKEN, ADEQUATE MANNING OF AMERICAN SERVICES AND PROTECTION OF US CITIZENS ARE NECESSARY TO SUPPORT THE LARGE AMERICAN PRESENCE IN IRAN AND AVOID UNNECESSARY STRAIN IN PEOPLE-TO-PEOPLE RELATIONS.

J. THROUGH MORE FREQUENT EXCHANGES WITH IRANIAN OFFICIALS IN A VARIETY OF MINISTRIES AND ORGANIZATIONS, AS WELL AS THE MFA, SEEK TO WIN INCREASING IRANIAN SUPPORT IN INTERNATIONAL FORA ON BOTH ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL ISSUES OF CONTINUING CONCERN TO THE USG. A GREATER DEGREE OF EMBASSY OFFICER TIME THAN IN THE PAST HAS BEEN AND WILL CONTINUE TO BE ALLOCATED TO THIS TASK.

K. MAINTAIN AN ADEQUATE ANTI-NARCOTICS PROGRAM IN IRAN, THROUGH THE AGENCY OF RESIDENT AND VISITING DEA AGENTS, SO AS TO CONTINUE GAINING IRANIAN COOPERATION IN LIMITING THE PRODUCTION OF OPIUM IN NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES AND THE TRANSIT OF DRUGS TO THE US, AS WELL AS MINIMIZING DRUG PROBLEMS AMONG THE AMERICAN COMMUNITY.

2. ISSUES.

A. THE MOST CRITICAL ISSUE IN OUR BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP IS AN EARLY WASHINGTON DECISION AS TO THE DIRECTION OF OUR POLICY OF CONVENTIONAL ARMS TRANSFERS TO IRAN. THIS WILL BE VIEWED HERE AS THE LYNCH PIN OF THE NEW ADMINISTRATION'S ATTITUDE TOWARD A CONTINUING CLOSE RELATIONSHIP WITH IRAN. WE RECOMMEND THE ISSUE BE

RESOLVED ALONG THE LINES SKETCHED UNDER MY DISCUSSION OF
THE FIRST COURSE OF ACTION ABOVE.

B. A RELATED ISSUE WILL BE THE EXTENT TO WHICH
WASHINGTON PRESSES CRITICISM OF THE IRANIAN HUMAN RIGHTS
SITUATION AS OPPOSED TO TAKING A MORE GRADUALIST APPROACH
TO ENCOURAGING REFORMS IN THIS FIELD. WE BELIEVE THE GOI
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WILL PUT UP WITH, AND EVEN COOPERATE IN, USG EFFORTS TO
IMPROVE BOTH IRAN'S IMAGE AND ITS PERFORMANCE, BUT US
EFFORTS IN THIS LINE MUST ALWAYS BE PERCEIVED AS THOSE OF
A CONCERNED FRIEND, EXCHANGING IDEAS ON COMMON AIMS, AND
BEAR NO REPEAT NO RESEMBLANCE TO IRANIAN MEMORIES OF
CAPITULATORY AND COLONIAL POLICIES IMPOSED ON IRAN BY
WESTERN GOVERNMENTS IN THE PAST.

C. EARLY WASHINGTON ATTENTION TO THE QUESTION
OF ASSURING ADEQUATE, RELIABLE NUCLEAR FUEL SUPPLY FOR
COUNTRIES LIKE IRAN WHICH ARE EMBARKING ON AMBITIOUS
NUCLEAR ENERGY DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS IS A WORTHWHILE GOAL
IN ITSELF AND SHOULD HAVE THE VALUABLE SIDE EFFECT OF
ENSURING ACTIVE IRANIAN SUPPORT FOR OUR WORLDWIDE NUCLEAR
NON-PROLIFERATION EFFORTS.

D. FINALLY, A RELATIVELY MINOR ISSUE IS
DISPOSITION OF IRAN'S OUTSTANDING WORK WAR II LEND-LEASE
DEBT, WHICH HAS RISEN (THROUGH PYRAMIDING OF INTEREST)
TO SOME \$35 MILLION AT PRESENT. WE RECOMMEND ENERGETIC
PURSUIT OF A SOLUTION, WHICH THE IRANIANS ALSO DESIRE,
EVEN IF IT MEANS SOME COMPROMISE ON THE SUMS INVOLVED TO
SAVE FACE ALL AROUND.
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